

3.0 Conclusions (Findings)

- 3.1 *The estimated time of arrival of the aircraft at Cranbrook, calculated by Calgary ATC, and used by Aeradio for advisory purposes was considerably in error and resulted in a traffic conflict between the arriving aircraft and a vehicle working on the runway.*
- 3.2 *The flight crew did not report by the Skookum beacon on final approach, as was the normal practice at Cranbrook, thereby allowing the incorrect ETA to remain undetected.*
- 3.3 *Regulatory provisions concerning mandatory pilot position reporting during instrument approaches were inadequate.*
- 3.4 *The interfaces between the organizations providing Air Traffic Services, Telecommunications (Aeradio) and Airports Services were not well enough developed to provide a reliable fail safe flight information service.*
- 3.5 *The pilots lost control of the aircraft consequent upon the left engine thrust reverser deploying in flight when the aircraft was at low speed, and in a high drag configuration.*
- 3.6 *The FAA design standards under which the Boeing 737 was constructed did not adequately provide for the possibility of an aborted landing after touchdown and thrust reverser initiation.*
- 3.7 *The lack of a suitable national system of incident reporting, investigation, and follow-up corrective action allowed operational problems to remain uncorrected.*
- 3.8 *Rescue efforts at the accident scene were hampered due to lack of a fire fighting vehicle capable of negotiating deep snow and shortage of trained rescue personnel.*